We show, for a wide variety of payoff functions, that the expected log optimal portfolio is also game theoretically optimal in a single play or in multiple plays of the stock market. Thus there is no essential conflict between good short-term and long-run performance. Both are achieved by maximizing the conditional expected log return.
Introduction
Suppose an investor is faced with a collection of m stocks X = (XI,X2, . . . , Xm) drawn according to some known joint distribution function F(x). We shall assume the stock values XI are nonnegative. The random variable XI is the value of a one unit investment in the ith stock. A portfolio is a vector b = (bl,. . . ,b,) E B = {bE Rm: b, 2 0, C b, = I}, with the interpretation that b, is the proportion of wealth allocated to stock i. The random capital S resulting from investment portfolio b is given by S = C b,X, = blX.
We examine the two-person zero-sum game with payoff E+(S1/S2), where + is any nondecreasing function, and S1= b:X, S2= b$X are the random capitals resulting from portfolio strategies bl and b2 against a market vector X 2 0 drawn according to some known distribution F(x). Let g I , g2denote random capitals obtained by fair randomization of SI and S2. How does one outperform another investor according to the criterion E+(S~~/&)?
It will be shown that a certain portfolio b* is the heart of the solution of all such games. More specifically, the game with payoff E + ( S "~/~~) is solved for either player by first employing fair randomization to the initial capital, where the randomization depends only on the function 6, and then distributing the resultant random capital according to the portfolio b*. In this sense b* is competitively optimal for all games +(g1/g2). The game theoretic optimal portfolio b* is characterized as that portfolio maximizing E In blX. Thus it has optimal asymptotic properties as well.
Specifically, we consider a two-person zero-sum game with payoff function E+(SI/S2). Players 1 and 2 each start with one unit of capital. A strategy for player i consists of a choice of a "fair" distribution function G,{w), GXO-) = 0, S wdG,(w) I 1, and a choice of portfolio b, E B. Player i then exchanges his unit of capital for the fair random variable (r.v.) W, --G,(w), and distributes the result W, of this gamble across the stocks according to portfolio b,. We assume that Wl, W2, and X are independent r.v.'s. The payoff to player 1 for the game is defined to be We call this the stock market +-game. If inf sup E+(Wlb:X/ W2b$X) = sup inf E+(Wlb:X/ W2biX) = v, (1.2) Let 3, = Wlb',X and g2= W2b$X. It can be seen that all of the following payoff functions can be written in the form E~(~I I & ) :
(h) the expected number of factors (rounded off to the nearest integer) by which SI exceeds s2. The payoff function P($ > i2), previously considered and solved in Bell and Cover (1980) , is obtained when we let 4 be the indicator function of [1, a ) .
We first consider in 52 the two-person zero-sum game with payoff function E+(Wl/ W2), where Wl and W2 are independent fair random variables (i.e., Wi r 0, EW i I1). We denote this the primitive &game because it does not involve a portfolio selection. 53 establishes the equivalence of ESIS* I1 for all S E S, and E In S/S* 5 0 for all SE S, if S is a convex family of random variables. This equivalence is the key to the proofs in 554, 5, and 6. 54 establishes that the minimax strategies for the portfolio &game ( 4 nondecreasing) are WTb*'X and Wfb*'X, where WT and Wf are the minimax strategies for the primitive &game and b* maximizes E In blX. It follows that the solution of the portfolio &game factors into two parts:
(1) a purely game theoretic randomization of the initial capital, depending only on
and (2) an allocation of the resulting capital according to b*. These results hold up for multistage market games, as shown in 455 and 6. Consequently, for 6 nondecreasing, the log optimal portfolio b* is the optimal allocation of resources for any two-person zero-sum game with payoff function E+(S"~/S"~). Development of the optimal asymptotic properties of b* can be found in Finkelstein and Whitley (198 l), Thorp (1969), Breiman (196 l) , Algoet and Cover (1988) and a critical discussion of such portfolios can be found in Samuelson (1 967, 1969 ). An algorithm for calculation b* is described in Cover (1984) . A development of robust portfolios is given in Cover and Gluss (1986) .
Pure Optimal Strategies for the Primitive @-Game
Consider the primitive &game with payoff function E + ( Wl/ W2), and strategies Wl, W2 E W, the set all nonnegative random variables with mean i 1. We shall call W the set of fair r.v.'s. As yet, there is no stock market or portfolio selection in the problem. We first wish to determine conditions on $I such that no randomization is needed to achieve the value of the game.
In the primitive +game, players 1 and 2 choose independent random variables Wl --G I , W2 --G2, where G I , G2 belong to the set G of distribution functions with expected value I1 and support set [O, co) .The payoff to player 1 is Distributions GT and Gf are optimal strategies if they satisfy the saddlepoint conditions for all G I , G2 E G. The value v, of the game is given by v, = S 4dGTdGf.
THEOREM The primitive $-game has pure optimal strategies WT = Wf 1 ifand 1. = only if$~'(l) 2 0 exists and for all t > 0. In this case the value of the game is v, = $(I).
REMARK. The family of functions &(t) = t", t > 0, satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 if 0 I a 5 1. The value of such a game is 1. We conclude, for example, that if two gamblers were to walk into a fair casino with the agreement that player 1 should receive E( W1/ W2) -1 from player 2, then neither should gamble.
The following proof is not essential for what follows. PROOF. Without loss of generality assume that $(I) = 0. Let $(t) = -$~(l/t). Since E$( W2) I 0 iff E+(1/ W2) 2 0, we note that the optimal strategies satisfy WT = W? = 1 iff E@(W,) I 0 for all W, E W and E$( W2) 5 0 for all W2 E W. F o r 0 < 6 < 1 a n d q > O , l e t 1 -6, with probability 7/(6 + r), W, = and { I + 7, with probability 6/(6 + n),
Note that EW, = EW2 = 1. Now E$( W,) 5 0 implies
Similarly, E$( W2) 5 0 implies which implies ~( l
These inequalities can be rewritten as Letting 6 4 0 for fixed 7 in the first inequality implies that 4 is left continuous at 1. A complementary analysis of the second inequality implies that @ is right continuous and thus continuous at 1.
Taking limits of (2.8) as 7 4 0 yields Since 4 is continuous and equals 0 at 1, the lim inf and lim sup are arbitrarily close together implying that lim,+o 4(1 + 7)/7 exists. Since this limit exists, (2.9) implies that lim6+o -4(1 -6)/6 also exists and that the two limits are equal. Taking limits of (2.9) as 6 4 0 and letting t = 1 + 17 now gives the desired result. Finally, relaxing the condition $(I) = 0, we apply the same analysis to the game 4(t) -4(1), to obtain (2.3).
Convex Families
The log optimal portfolio b* has the property E In (b*'X/blX) 2 0 for all b E B = {b: C b, = 1, b, 2 0). The crucial fact needed for the game theoretic results in the next section is the existence of a portfolio b** such that E(b1X/b**'X) I 1, for all b E B. That the portfolios b* and b** are the same is a consequence of the following more general result on convex families of random variables. DEFINITION. S is said to be a convexfamily of random variables if the members of S are defined on the same probability space and if S1, S2E S implies AS1+ (1 -A)S2 E S, for all 0 5 X 5 1. EXAMPLE 1. Random returns generated by portfolios. Let X --F(x), x E Rm.Then the set of random variables
is a convex family.
EXAMPLE 2. Random returns generated by constrained portfolios. If the set of allowed portfolios b is a convex set Bo,then S = {Sb= blX: b E Bo)is a convex family.
EXAMPLE 3. Random returns generated by portfolios based on the past. Consider n sequential plays against a market X I , X 2 ,
. . . ,n. Let bl, b2(x1) 
1,2, . . . n. This doesn't work. Neither does the device of i = choosing {bll')with probability X and {bi2')with probability 1 -A. However, if one divides the initial 1 unit capital into an amount X to be invested according to {b~l'):=l and an amount 1 -pooling the money "on X to be invested according to { b~' } : = l , paper" only at time n, the result is the desired S = AS'" + ( 1 -X)S(2). This can be viewed as a sequential portfolio-a value weighted average of 61'' and bj2). Thus the family S is convex.
If -co < supsEs E In S < co is achieved for some S* in S, then necessarily E In (S/S*) I 0, for all S E S. We now establish that this characterization of S* is equivalent to E(S/S*) I 1 , for all S E S, if S is a convex family. This equivalence is central to the subsequent theory. Note that the following theorem does not require -co < E l n S * < c o . At this point it is perhaps wise to specialize the convex family S in order to make some concrete assertions about the original stock market problem. We do this in the following sequence of corollaries.
Of course, S, E S and ES,/S*
COROLLARY If -co < supsEsE In S < co is achieved for some S* E S , then S * 1 . satisjes (3.1) and (3.2) in Theorem 2.
Consequently the investment S* maximizing expected log return outperforms all other investments in the sense that E ( S / S * ) I 1, for all S E S .
where Sb = btX, and b* achieves 2.
for all i,
REMARK. These are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. See Bell and Cover (1980) ,Finkelstein and Whitley ( 1 98 l ) , Breiman ( 1 96 1 ) and Thorp ( 1 969) .
PROOF. We note that S is a convex family and that S is the convex hull of { X i ) g l .
We first show that (3.7) implies (3.2), since Summarizing, if S = { C g l b i X i ) is the set of all random capitals resulting from portfolios of the stocks {Xi)p"=l, and if -co < supsEs E In S < co,then the following three characterizations of S* are equivalent:
(
EX,/S* I1, for all i, and b: = 0 , if E X l / S * < 1 . As a final note, consider the partial ordering S I 2 S2 iff E ( S 2 / S I ) I 1, for S l ,S2 E S a convex family. We have shown this partially ordered set has a maximal element S*. Now consider the partial ordering induced by expected logarithms, i.e., SI 2 S2iff E In S2 I E In S,. This ordering is transitive and has a maximal element S**. Although the orderings induced by E(SI /S2) and E In SI-E In S2are different, they have the same maximal element S* = S**. This may answer to some extent the concerns of Samuelson (1969) about the difficulties (based on intransitivity) with the notion of finding the "best" portfolio.
The +Game for the Stock Market
We now show that the log optimal portfolio b* has short-term robustness properties in that it simultaneously solves many competitive stock market games.
Recall the stock market @-game of $1. Players 1 and 2 each start with one unit of capital. A strategy for player i consists of a choice of a "fair" distribution function Gi(w), Gi(O-) = 0, S wdGi(w)I 1, and a choice of portfolio bi E B. He then exchanges his unit of capital for the fair random variable Wi -Gi(w), and distributes the result W, of this gamble across the stocks according to portfolio bi. We assume that Wl , W2, and X are independent r.v.'s. The payoff to player 1 for the game is defined to be We now solve for the optimal strategies in this game.
Let WT -GT, Wf -G t denote the minimax strategies for the primitive @-game, and let v, denote the value of this game given by
where W is the set of all fair r.v.'s W 2 0, E W I 1. Let b* maximize E In btX, and let S* = b*'X. THEOREM 3. Let $(t) be a monotonic nondecreasing function. Then the two-person zero-sum game with payoflE@( Wlb{X/ W2blX) has a value v, and optimal strategies where b* is log optimal, and GT, Gf solve the primitive @-game.
REMARK. The optimal strategies for the stock market @-game factor into two parts:
(1) the game-theoretic randomization WT, Wf ,designed solely to win the primitive @-game where no subsequent market investment is allowed, and (2) a deterministic choice of portfolio bT = bf = b*, identical for both players, chosen independently of the payoff criterion @. This choice b* is defined by its log optimality.
PROOF. We observe that for any W2 E W and S2E S, Similarly, since WISI IS* E W, Consequently, Wl = WT, bl = b*, W2 = Wf ,b2 = b* achieve the value v, of the game.
Multistage Market Games
In the previous theorem, the stock market game provided only one investment opportunity. We now consider n investment periods, with compounding of the investment each time and reallocation of the capital across the stocks based on the past. Suppose we are to invest sequentially in a market process Xi E RT, with known joint distribution (XI, X2, . . . , Xn) -F(xl, x2, . . . , xn). Again fair randomization is allowed. We now show that log optimal portfolios remain optimal in this multistage game against time dependent stocks. THEOREM 4. The optimal portfolio strategies for the n-stage market game are given, for both players 1 and 2, by bf(XI, X2, . . . ,Xk-]), k = 1, . . . ,n, where bf maximizes the conditional expected log return E(ln btXk I X I , XZ, . . . , Xk-l). The optimal randomization is given by WT -GT , Wf -G f , where GT , GT solve the primitive @-game with payofE@( Wl / W2) and corresponding value v,. The value of the n-stage market game 1s v,.
PROOF. From the proof of Example 3 in $3, we know that the set S of all Sn generated by sequential portfolios is a convex family. Thus, if S ? maximizes E In Sn over all SnE S, then ESn/S$ 5 1, for all SnE S, which is all that is needed to apply the minimax argument of Theorem 3.
It remains only to find S,*and the associated log optimal sequential portfolio. We observe n E In Sn= E ln n biXk k= I
The maximum of each term E ( E In biXk I X I , XZ, . . . ,Xk-1)) over bk(X1, X2, . . . ,Xk-I) is achieved by the maximum conditional expected log return portfolio bf(xl, x2, . . . , xk-]) achieving max E(ln b' Xk I X I , X2, . . . ,Xk-l). This sequential portfolio maximizes E l n S,.
Example: Posterior Randomization Based on Relative Capital
Now let us allow the players to observe each other's progress over many rounds of investment.
How do competitive investment decisions change? Do the investors jockey for position in a non log optimal way? We shall allow an initial fair randomization by each player. Both players then observe the outcomes W' P' , W' : '
. A portfolio choice b:", b: " is then announced and XI is revealed to both players. Another round of fair randomization is allowed and portfolios by', by' are announced, and so forth. The stock market process X I , X2, . . . ,Xn E R' : can be dependent.
After a tortuous development of conditionally game theoretic optimal play, we shall find that the obvious first guess at optimal play is minimax-use the conditionally expected log optimal portfolio from $5 at each stage and finish with a fair randomization Wg ,all without regard to the opponent's fortunes. Knowledge of one's opponent's progress allows sharper play but is not necessary to achieve the value of the game.
We know (Bell and Cover 1980 ) that if two gamblers with equal capital try to outgamble one another in the zero sum game with payoff P( Wl 2 W2}, then the value of the game is 4 and the optimal strategies for both players are to choose W, according All of this suggests a similar problem in the stock market game with payoff E @ ( WISI / W2S2). Suppose investors 1 and 2 choose their respective portfolio strategies bl and b2. Then the stock vector X and the resulting capitals S1= b{X and S2= biX are revealed. At this point each player is allowed to exchange his capital S, for a fair r.v. S,W,, where W, E W, and W is the set of all nonnegative r.v.'s with mean no greater than one. But since the purpose is to play the @-game, each player chooses his distribution for W, based on the knowledge of the relative capital SIIS2. HOW should they play? Formally, the game is as follows. The conditionally randomized market game. Player 1 chooses a portfolio bl E B and an indexed set of fair random variables Wl(x, S I , S2) E W, where x E Rm, S I , S2E R. Player 2 simultaneously chooses b2 E B, and an indexed set of r.v.'s W2(x, Sl,S2)E W. The payoff to player 1 is Before solving this market @-game, we digress to analyze the primitive @-game with unequal starting capitals.
Let v,(u) = infW2,, supwlEw E@(uWl/W2). In particular, v,(l) = v,, as previously defined. We next argue that v,(u) is concave in u. This is reasonable, since player 1 can exchange u for ul and u2 with fair randomization and then play the game @(ul Wl / W2) or @(u2 Wl/ W2) optimally. This is captured in the following lemma.
LEMMA. For any @: R+ + R, @ nondecreasing, v,(u) is a concave nondecreasing function of u. Now to put the stock market back into the game. Let S1= b:X, S2= b$X.
THEOREM The conditionally randomized &game has value v, and optimal strate-5. gies
where b* is log optimal, and WT,, W?, are optimal in the primitive @game with equal starting capitals. Thus unconditional randomization is suficient to achieve the value of the game.
PROOF. It is enough to show that the strategies above satisfy the saddlepoint conditions (see (2.1)):
For the first inequality we verify that (6.5) because of the conditional fairness of W l ( . , . , .) and the conditions for S* developed in Theorem 2 . Also, WT, and Wl(X, S I , S*)SI / S f are independent and nonnegative. Thus by the saddlepoint condition for primitive @-games, and the first inequality is established. The second inequality follows from a similar verification for WT, and W2(X, S*, S2)S2/S* with reference again to the saddlepoint conditions for primitive &games.
It is a curious fact that unconditional randomization WT,, W f , for either player achieves as much game-theoretically as conditional randomization W l ( x , S I , S2), W2(x, S I,S2) . Isn't it foolish for player i to ignore the relative capital S1 /S2 when he uses his final randomization to outperform the other player? Yes and no. One reason is that, if bl = b*, b2 = b*, then S I IS2 = S*/S* = 1 , the ratio of player capital will be 1, and the players are thrown into the primitive $-game where WT,, W f , are optimal. So conditional randomization is not needed if both use the log optimal portfolio b*. Apparently, it follows as a result ofthe mathematics that any deviation from S* by one of the players intended to set up a better competitive position for the subsequent randomization hurts the player. This is reflected in the fact that E(S/S*)r 1 , for all S; i.e., S/S* is a subfair random variable and composing it with a fair randomization leaves it subfair.
One final point. Although conditional randomization is not necessary to achieve the value of the game, it is true that use of conditionally minimax randomization WT(X, S I , S2) and W f ( X , S I , S2) is sharper than use of unconditionally minimax randomization WT4, Wf,. Both strategies are minimax, but the conditional randomization dominates the unconditional randomization. Both achieve v,, but conditional randomization is superior when either player deviates from the log optimal S*.In short, the unconditional randomization WIC,is minimax but not admissible.
Conclusions
First consider payoff functions @(SI IS2),like S I IS2 satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1. Apparently, any investor competing with another investor according to such a payoff criterion will achieve the value of the game by choosing the conditional expected log optimal portfolio at each investment opportunity. No randomization is required. This is true for all such 6, arbitrary time dependent market processes, and for every stopping time n. Moreover, if conditions on q5 are relaxed to include all nondecreasing functions, then the same sequential portfolio selections, followed now by appropriate fair randomization, is minimax. In short, the investor does not need to know q5 or n in order to choose his portfolio at each time.
Here is a possible reason for the robustness of log optimal portfolios. Since the ratio of capitals S,/S,* at time n, where S,* is the capital induced by the conditionally log optimal portfolio and Snis the capital induced by any other sequential portfolio, obeys we see Sn/S,*belongs to the set of all fair random variables. In this sense, Sn is always within "fair reach" of S ; . So it is not surprising that log optimal portfolios behave well in the competitive investment game.
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